

The Enemies Within: Loyalty, Faction and Elite Competition under Authoritarianism*

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Abstract

Loyalty is a permanent concern to all dictators. However, it is unclear whether loyalty is enough to assure the ruling group's cohesiveness. In this study, we argue that authoritarian elites, while remaining loyal to their superior, often risk group interests to maximize their self-interest under authoritarian competition. Elites within one authoritarian faction thus tend to compete intensely rather than cooperate, in order to outrival their peers. To empirically test our argument, we collect data on Chinese political elites and exploit all media reports in regional newspapers from 2000 to 2014 on corruption investigations and major industrial accidents. We find that Chinese political elites are more likely to promote negative news related to their faction peers than they are to promote similar news regarding other faction members. We also find that negative news reports indeed reduce the promotion probability of reported cadres, while increasing that of reporting ones.

Keywords: authoritarianism, elite competition, faction, media, China.

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Introduction

No leader can govern a country alone; even the most powerful dictator needs a group of ruling elites. To appoint those bureaucratic elites in the absence of effective electoral constraints, authoritarian leaders tend to rely heavily upon a hierarchy of power, wherein the top leaders must be consistently concerned with the loyalty of their subordinates. Recent literature claims that loyalty concerns lead authoritarian leaders to hire mediocre but loyal subordinates instead of competent but potentially threatening bureaucrats (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Reuter and Robertson 2012; Bai and Zhou 2014; Zakharov 2014; Rochlitz 2016). However, scholars have not yet examined the extent to which loyalty to the leader might affect the group cohesion of a ruling faction. This involves two sub-questions: Is loyalty an unambiguous, one-or-zero matter? And do loyal subordinates always prioritize the leader's interests over their own? In this paper, we examine the behaviors of authoritarian elites within political factions to seek answers to these questions.

Theoretically, we highlight a puzzle in the organizational features of authoritarian factions and their behavioral implications. We claim that authoritarian elite factions resemble a tournament competition in which in-group members in a faction compete intensely with each other to climb up the political ladder. This tournament theory predicts that members of same elite group with a similar rank will compete with one another rather than protect or cooperate with their factional peers to protect the group or to maximize the group interest. As in a tournament, the closer their ranks are, the fiercer the competition will be to win the current round and advance to the next level in the hierarchical political system. In this set-up, while the faction members remain loyal to their political patron, they may compete fiercely

to outrival one another, often putting at risk the faction's group interests.

We test this theory using data from Chinese political elites. In view of China's staggering economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese political structure has been a frequent subject of research. Numerous studies attribute the success to a meritocratic system of bureaucracy that rewards cadres from areas with rapid local economic growth with a higher probability of promotion, on the logic that a high economic growth rate signals the competence of the cadre as a political leader (Chen, Li and Zhou 2005; Li and Zhou 2005; Maskin, Qian and Xu 2000; Yao and Zhang 2015). Subsequent studies, however, question and refute the explanatory power of economic performance in predicting elite promotion (Guo 2007; Landry 2008; Landry, Lü and Duan 2015). Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) alternatively argue that factional ties play a critical role in shaping the political structure in China, with strong empirical evidence drawn from the Central Committee members of the Chinese Communist Party (1982-2007). Keller (2014) and Jaing and Zhang (2015) further support the factional ties argument by demonstrating the important impact that personal connections to key central politicians have on political promotion and resource allocation.

While these studies on political factions highlight a rather obscure aspect of the Chinese political system, they do not offer clear expectations regarding the political behaviors of authoritarian elites, except to note that they tend to be loyal to their political patrons. Other political relationships within and across factions remain broadly understudied. This study addresses that shortcoming in the literature by approaching the puzzle of loyalty in authoritarian politics from a different angle, to understand the political incentives of authoritarian elites in terms of horizontal interactions in addition to vertical ones. In doing so, we demonstrate that loyalty to a superior is not identical to loyalty to the patron's ruling group. While remaining

entirely loyal to their patrons, authoritarian elites often put the group interests of the patron's faction at risk to maximize their own self-interest under authoritarian competition.

To analyze these claims, we collect data on Chinese Politburo standing committee leaders and on provincial leaders (both party secretaries and governors), as well as all media reports in provincial newspapers from 2000 to 2014 on corruption investigations and major industrial accidents. We examine what type of news tends to be reported by whom, and we focus in particular on negative news reports by elites regarding the governance of their faction peers, as compared to similar reports regarding members of different factions.

The empirical analyses provide evidence that supports our tournament theory: Chinese political elites are more likely to promote negative news regarding their faction peers. Faction peers, particularly those at competitive positions, more frequently report news on their faction peers political defects. Furthermore, the findings do not result from public demand for such news reports, as we observe the pattern more prominently in party-line newspapers than in commercial newspapers. Once reported in other provincial newspapers in detail, the negative news is then more likely to appear in national newspapers in Beijing. Finally, we find that negative news reports indeed reduce the promotion probability of reported cadres.

This study contributes to the literature on authoritarian elite competition by clarifying the incentive structure of political subordinates. Our empirical evidence on intra-faction competition among Chinese elites shows that clients under the same patron do not by default cooperate with one another; rather, they compete intensely for political resources and support from their patron. This does not mean the clients are disloyal. Indeed, they may remain fiercely loyal to their patron, but they are not group-interested. Counter to an implicit assumption in many studies, loyalty does not imply that a client would prioritize the leader's

interest over his own.

Elite Competition in Authoritarian Regime

Authoritarian regimes do not depend on free elections as a mechanism for bureaucratic appointment. As a result, the recruitment of bureaucrats stands as one of the principal tasks, and concerns, of the ruler. Recent studies on authoritarian governance have focused on the loyalty-competence tradeoff in authoritarian appointments. In most cases, those studies claim that dictators rely on loyal subordinates despite the fact that competent subordinates could govern better, because competent ones may betray and oust the dictator. This means that, while competent candidates may be available, authoritarian leaders tend to promote less competent but more loyal candidates to minimize the probability of internal political turnover. [Egorov and Sonin \(2011\)](#) theorize the dilemma in a dynamic game. They argue and provide descriptive evidence that a leader with a longer time horizon has stronger incentives to hire competent agents, while those with short shadows of the future choose loyal ones. [Landry \(2008\)](#) argue that the Chinese Communist Party has managed to overcome this dilemma since economic reform by promoting meritocratic and politically loyal cadres using a strictly hierarchical personnel system. In contrast, [Reuter and Robertson \(2012\)](#) and [Rochlitz \(2016\)](#) show that authoritarian elections in Russia have led the leader to appoint less competent but loyal bureaucrats to win the election.

Our study is germane to this literature in that we analyze loyalty-related political behaviors of authoritarian elites. At the same time, we raise several questions regarding the assumptions in authoritarian recruitment studies. In previous studies, loyal-type and competent-type

bureaucratic elites are exogenously distributed and are discernable from one another. Therefore, the main question has typically been whom the leader would choose to hire given the loyalty-competence trade off. Scholars also assume that as long as a subordinate decides to remain loyal, i.e. to stay in the leader's faction, they will prioritize the political interests of the leader. We argue that these assumptions reflect the dictator's perspective, but not the subordinates'. From the subordinates' point of view, loyalty may not be a one-or-zero choice. Rather, they strategically decide the level and the type of loyalty in order to maximize their own political interests. Whether they will be loyal, how loyal they will be, and to whom or for which purpose may all be decisions that bureaucratic elites weigh in the course of service to the dictator. If necessary, subordinates may even hinder the faction's interests, without betraying the patron's interests, for their own benefit.

Our argument stands close to a recent paper by [Zakharov \(2014\)](#). As [Zakharov \(2014\)](#) emphasizes, loyalty-based behaviors may be costly to the client because the appointer's needs are not necessarily aligned with the appointed. Working for the patron's interest can therefore impose political costs on the clients. In our paper, we further argue that given the cost of signaling loyalty, subordinates will maximize their own interests instead of the factions, despite the fact that the patron would value the faction's interest above the individual subordinate's.

While addressing the broader issue of loyalty in authoritarian politics, this study more specifically contributes to the literature on political factions. Factions, defined as informal hierarchical networks of elites, exist in any polity.¹ In democracies, scholars have presented theories and evidence to describe and analyze the role of political factions in the political

¹For further traits and examples of factions discussed in the literature, see [Persico, Pueblita and Silverman \(2011\)](#).

process (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder 2009; Persico, Pueblita and Silverman 2011; Boucek 2012). However, the implications of factional politics differ in authoritarian regimes, where political parties are either dependent on or influenced by the incumbent regime. Even in multiparty authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Iran, political parties are not independent from the incumbent leader, and the freedom of political parties is significantly limited even in an authoritarian regime with competitive elections. Moreover, in single-party authoritarian regime like China, where no internal party competition exists, factions represent the entities through which the political competition for power takes place. Factions launch coups, struggle, and share political power in authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999, 2003; Pepinsky 2014).

In the context of Chinese politics, Andrew Nathan's article and the rebuttals that followed built a theoretical foundation for the study of factionalism in China (Nathan 1973; Tsou 1976; Dittmer and Wu 1995; Dittmer 1995; Pye 1995; Nathan and Tsai 1995). Generally speaking, factional patrons distribute political and economic resources to sustain the loyalty of their client officials. Yet, given the staggering economic success of China as a country, scholars have begun focusing greater attention on the meritocratic features of Chinese bureaucracy (Maskin, Qian and Xu 2000; Xu 2011). Scholars of factionalism, however, argue that, even with notable economic growth, factionalism continues to play an important role in political decisions, including personnel appointment and resource allocations (Huang 2000; Nathan 2003; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012; Zhang 2014). In particular, Victor Shih's research provides empirical evidence showing a clear and strong association between political connections to top party leaders and access to resources and political promotions (Shih 2004, 2008; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). That the core feature of factional politics is loyalty to the top has thus emerged

as a consensus among this set of scholars. Ambitious politicians have a strong incentive to signal their loyalty to factional patrons, which may come at an expense of policy efficiency or public welfare (Shih 2008).

One key difference between these two perspectives is their behavioral implication. A theory favoring meritocracy as an explanation for China's structure and success implies that politicians at the same rank would compete with each other to advance up the bureaucratic ladder, because a person who scores higher in the evaluation criteria has higher probability of promotion. M-form theory by Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000) and Xu (2011) makes the behavioral prediction even clearer in China: public officers working at the same administrative level, they argue, compete intensely with each other to outperform the rest in terms of economic growth. On the other hand, the implication of factional theory on political behavior is less clear at the lower level. Factional research has focused mostly on two relationships: the cooperative, vertical ties between a patron and a client ("A" in Figure 1), and the competing or even hostile horizontal relationship among patrons ("B" in Figure 1). The expectation drawn from the literature is that the patron will promote his or her clients along the political and bureaucratic career ladder, while demoting members of other factions (Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). Economic resources may also be distributed through factional ties. A recent study by Jaing and Zhang (2015) claims that patrons provide their clients with financial resources to support local economic performance, thereby enhancing their career profiles and increasing their odds of promotion.

Nonetheless, both theory and empirical research have been rather silent about the horizontal relationship among clients, within ("C" in Figure 1) or between ("D" in Figure 1) factions. One implicit assumption from the emerging literature on factional politics concerns inter-




Figure 1: Diagram of Factional Structure

clients relationships and behaviors: in most cases, a faction is considered a unitary political entity in which the members share a common political destiny (Geddes 1999, 2003; Pepinsky 2014; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). Our study challenges this implicit assumption and aims to examine the intra-factional behaviors of faction members. One fundamental feature of a faction is that there are by necessity more clients than patrons. What, then, is the nature of relationships that clients have with their peers? Are they comrades, friends, rivals or enemies?

We hypothesize the following two outcomes, the distinction depending largely on how one theorizes the concept of faction. One possibility is that a faction may work as a *gang*. A gang is generally a group sharing a common destiny, in which solidarity is crucial. Although the members at the same rank may compete with each other, competition cannot cross the common destiny of the gang. Once they face competition from outsiders, loyalty unites gang members in cooperation. If the gang as a group becomes vulnerable, moreover, the natural reaction from the members would be to protect the group in unity. The existing literature on authoritarian politics, which generally treats factions as political unities, supports this

gang theory (Geddes 1999, 2003; Pepinsky 2014). If a faction functions like a gang, one can assume that faction members will work in cooperation for the benefit of the patron. Thus, major competition should occur across the factional line, meaning that factional clients will compete against other factions' clients to prove their loyalty to their patron and to maximize the patron's political benefit.

The other conceptualization is that a faction functions as a *tournament*. In tournaments, participants compete with each other to be selected as the winner of that round. Given the pyramidal structure of a faction, clients always outnumber patrons. Even in Chinese factions, where some clients have multiple patrons, the number of patrons is still larger than the number of clients. In this structure, the patron can neither promote nor favor *all* clients at the same time. Patrons can only favor their clients to the extent that limited resources allow, given that the patrons themselves are in competition with other patrons. More importantly, a patron would not promote many clients at the same time, in order to strategically keep loyalty at the highest level. If promotion were predictable and guaranteed, the incentive of clients to behave loyally for the patron would likely diminish, as doing so would not change their career trajectories. For this reason, having connections to a patron may be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one to achieve a promotion. In this set-up, factional peers are those who compete in the same tournament for the current round, while the members of other factions are potential competitors in the future rounds. Therefore, the tournament theory predicts fierce competition, rather than cooperation or protection, within a political faction.

The empirical analyses presented in the following sections focus on this organizational nature of factions, and examine whether faction co-members behave in a cohesive manner consistent with the interests of the group or whether they attempt to outlive one another.

Empirical Strategy

Data

Thus far, we have suggested that faction politics in an authoritarian regime induces intensive intra-factional competition, whereby members of the same faction at a similar rank compete with one another rather than cooperate with or protect the other faction members. To empirically test our theoretical claim, we collect comprehensive data on the career backgrounds of all public officers in the central and provincial governments in China.

To understand the political competition and cooperation among elites, we analyze news content in the major local (provincial and prefecture level) newspapers in China, to investigate how political competition influences “negative” news reports. Using the largest news content database of Chinese media, a Hong-Kong based data vendor known as *WiseNews*, we aggregate the contents of 143 local mainstream newspapers in Mainland China from 2000 to the end of 2014. Among these 143 newspapers, 49 are party newspapers directly controlled by the provincial or prefectural party committees, while the other 94 are commercial newspapers controlled by regional news corporations. Geographically, these newspapers cover 30 provinces in Mainland China, though not Beijing. Beijing newspapers are excluded from our local newspaper pool, as Beijing newspapers are considered to be national newspapers. Therefore, Beijing local leaders are also excluded from all analyses. Through keyword searching and article counting, we construct media coverage data over two types of negative events: large-scale industrial accidents and corruption investigations in local governments. Then we match the number of news reports per year to over 13,000 dyads of provincial leaders. More specifically, we identify the provincial party secretary and governor where the newspaper article is

published (news provinces, hereafter) and those of the provinces in which the event reportedly occurred (event provinces, hereafter).

We also construct a panel data set that consists of the political careers of Chinese politicians in provincial governments and in the central government to identify factional information and political turnover. We first identify provincial party secretaries and governors over our period of analysis by collecting the names of those provincial party secretaries and governors from the China Communist Yearbook (*zhonggongnianbao*). To obtain factional connection and promotion data, we search for their personal biographies, including a number of individual characteristics ranging from age, gender, and place of birth to education and work history, using the Chinese internet search engine Baidu Encyclopedia (*baidu baike*). By matching the personal information and work histories of provincial officials with information on the Politburo Standing Committee members, we construct faction network information for each provincial leader in our sample. Finally, provincial economic performances and other socio-economic variables are collected from the *China Statistics Yearbook* (*zhongguo tongji nianjian*).

All variables are summarized in Table A.1. Panel A presents summary statistics of news reports and Panel B presents the province leader-year for party secretaries and governors. On corruption, provincial newspapers published on average more than one report per year on a corruption investigation in another province. The average number of dyads reporting an industrial accident in another province is 0.6 per year. However, the distribution is highly right-skewed. In extreme cases, newspapers in a province reported 161 times on a corruption scandal in another province within one year. On industrial accidents, the maximum number is even higher, at 197 reports. Out of 450 party secretary-years (30 provinces \times 15 years), 20 percent of party secretaries belong to the same faction. For provincial governors, 15 percent

of the dyads share the same patron at the Politburo. Out of 450 party secretaries, less than ten percent (9.25 %) are promoted at the end of tenure. In most cases (83 percent), they stay in office or transfer to a similar position. About seven percent of the leader-years end in retirement. There are only two cases of apparent demotion. The distribution of turnover outcomes for governors is similar to that of provincial leaders.

Specification

Our baseline model employs a province-pair panel from 2000 to 2014.

$$\begin{aligned}
 NewsCount_{ijt} = & \alpha + \beta_1 SameFaction_{ijt} + \beta_2 AgeGap_{ijt} + \beta_3 TenureGap_{ijt} + \\
 & + X_{ijt}\eta + \gamma_i + \delta_j + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Our key dependent variable *NewsCount* is the log numbers of bilateral news reports published in province *i* on negative events that occurred in province *j* in year *t*. Our key explanatory variable measures the faction affiliation of the provincial leader dyads. Thus, we construct a dummy variable to see if the two provincial party secretaries (or governors) belong to the same faction. We define two politicians as belonging to the same faction if both officials are connected to the same Politburo member (in terms of either originating from the same home town, studying at the same university, or previously working in the same department). To estimate the possibility of political competition, we use two measures to control for rank of provincial leaders. First, we employ the age gap between two public officials. Second, we measure the tenure year gap between two leaders. The rationale for these two measures is that officials with similar ages or tenure years are more likely to be considered together as

candidates for promotion in the evaluation process. We also control for potential confounding factors including the GDP growth rate gap across respective province dyads. In addition, we include two sets of province fixed effects for news reporting, province and event province (γ_i and δ_j , respectively) to control for any unobserved regional factors. We also employ year fixed effects (λ_t).

We further examine whether the media coverage on negative events affects the political career of provincial leaders using the following specification.

$$Turnover_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 NewsCount_{it}^{cor} + \beta_2 NewsCount_{it}^{acc} + X_{it}\eta + \gamma_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Following Li and Zhou (2005), *Turnover* is coded as an ordinal variable, with promotion taking on the value of 4, lateral transfer to positions of the same rank and/or staying in office 3, retirement to the advisory position in the People’s Congress or Political Consultative Conference 2 and demotion 1. The key explanatory variable is the total number of the two types of negative events that happened in province i at year t . $NewsCount_{it}^{cor}$ refers to the news reports on safety accidents and $NewsCount_{it}^{acc}$ represents the corruption cases. To address the possibility that our findings are sensitive to this coding method, we also apply an indicator variable for promotion as a robustness check, by recoding the other political turnovers as 0.

Result

Before presenting our main findings, we first show the loyalty-oriented behaviors of provincial leaders in Table 1. The results in Table 1 demonstrate that provincial party secretaries with

factional ties publish more news on their Politburo patron in their regional newspapers. The coefficient is not small: party secretaries publish 14 percent more news reports on their patron (Model (1)). Furthermore, we find that clients' reports increase notably in the year of the National People's Congress (Model (2)).² Although the same effects exist among provincial governors, they are marginally significant and the size of coefficients is smaller.

Table 2 and Table 3 present the baseline results of our empirical analyses. Analyses reported in Table 2 examine the number of news reports of all party secretary dyads who served from 2000 to 2014, while Table 3 presents results related to all provincial governors who worked during the same period. Model (1) in Table 2 employs a simple specification with relevant fixed effects. We first test whether dyads of provincial party secretaries sharing the same faction leader report more or less on the other's corruption investigation. As the result shows, a pair of party secretaries sharing the same faction leader are more likely to report on the other's corruption investigation. The estimation reveals that a dyad of faction peers is 50 percent more likely to report on each other's negative news.

Note that we contrast dyads sharing a faction to all other cases including different faction members and party secretaries without factional ties in Model (1). However, grouping dyads of party secretaries with no factional ties and a dyad of different faction members together would be problematic. If a faction function like a gang, party secretaries affiliated in different factions would promote critical reports on each other while covering up co-faction members' misgovernment. To address this problem, we separate the reference group into four categories: [1] only event province leader has a factional tie (News= 0 & Event= 1); [2] only news reporting

²The National People's Congress is held in Beijing every five years and the majority of political turnovers occur in this year.

province leader has a factional tie (News= 1 & Event= 0); [3] both leaders do not have any tie (News= 0 & Event= 0); [4] two leaders in dyad belong to different factions. By including group [1] to [3] indicators in the analysis, we leave the dyads of different factional ties as a reference group in Model (2). In this specification, a dyad of co-faction party secretaries shows a clear tendency to report on the other faction member's corruption investigation, which confirms the intra-faction competition argument.

Models (3) to (5) further test whether multiple factional ties, in contrast to a single factional tie, matter in terms of reporting on other party secretaries' negative news. While politicians sharing a faction leader are 40 to 50 percent more likely to report on a faction peer's corruption cases, nuanced effects are found in regard to the features of factional ties. Party secretaries with multiple faction ties are more likely to report negative news on others, whereas those with a single factional tie do not report significantly more on other's corruption scandals. Meanwhile, party secretaries with a single faction tie are much less likely to be attacked by other provinces' newspapers about corruption investigations under their governance. While party secretaries with a single tie are 20 to 23 percent less likely to be reported by others, those with multiple factional ties do not experience such benefits.

All models include province fixed effects and year fixed effects. These fixed effects control for any province-specific or year-specific trends in news reports. Province and year fixed effects also prevent the possibility that a certain event drive our results. Other variables that highlight career incentives demonstrate expected results. Party secretaries at a similar age and at similar place in the political cycle, measured by years in office, are more likely to report on one another's political misbehavior such as a corruption scandal.

We further investigate whether the findings of intra-faction competition are indeed driven

by elite cadres' career incentives. If career incentives are the reason behind the competitive reporting behavior among members of the same faction, those cadres with the most competitive status should report most intensely on other member's negative events. For instance, those at a similar age or having stayed for similar periods in the provincial office should be more likely to compete in terms of future turnover, and potentially promotion, consideration. We examine this possibility by employing interaction terms between the age gap and factional affiliation, and between the years-in-office gap and factional ties. The results, presented in Table A.2, support our hypothesis. All interaction terms are estimated negative, suggesting that the smaller the age gap or the years-in-office gap between two provincial leaders, the more likely they are to report on each other's negative news. The interaction term of the years-in-office gap and same faction is negative and statistically significant, while the interaction term with the age gap is negative but insignificant.

Estimations reported in Table 3 replicate the same analyses using the pool of provincial governors. Given the more administrative and less political nature of the position, we find the effects to be somewhat smaller and weaker among dyads of provincial governors. This result suggests that intra-faction competition among provincial governors is less intense than that of party secretaries. Yet, the pattern remains consistent: governors sharing the same faction leader tend to promote negative news on their faction peer's province. Some of the detailed effects differ from those of party secretaries, however. Among the provincial governors, those with a single faction tie are more likely to attack the other, while governors with multiple factional ties are more likely to be targeted.

Are these results specific to corruption investigations? It is noteworthy that the period we investigate is prior to Xi Jinping's time in office, so the recent anti-corruption campaign is

not relevant to our study. Nonetheless, if intra-faction competition explains elite behavior in authoritarian regimes, we should find similar patterns regarding other politically salient issues. We choose massive industrial accidents as another critical issue in China (Nie, Jiang and Wang 2013; Jia and Nie forthcoming; Shi and Xi 2016). The majority of industrial accidents in our dataset are coalmine accidents, and the second most prominent type of accident involves the chemical industry. Coal mining has been a notorious cause of deaths due to unsafe work conditions in China; in 2002, for instance, 6,995 mine workers were killed in 4,344 coal mine accidents, according to official statistics published by the State Work Safety Supervision Administration (China Labour Bulletin 2008). Including unregistered small mines, the actual death toll is presumed to be much higher.

A more critical fact to provincial leaders is that deadly accidents at coal production sites have generated significant attention from the top leaders. It is well-known that the Vice Premier and soon-to-be Premier, Wen Jiabao, celebrated the 2003 Chinese New Year by eating dumplings with coal miners at 2,300 feet underground in Fuxin, Liaoning province, promising an improvement in coalmine safety (People's Daily 2003). He visited another coal city that had suffered a major accident for the New Year in 2004, and another one in 2005, showing how determined the new leadership was on the mine-safety issue (China Daily 2005). Since 2003, due to the central government's policy decision to improve worker conditions in coal mines, the death toll has gradually decreased.³

Table 4 shows similar patterns in inter-provincial news reporting of industrial safety accidents compared to those on corruption investigations. Provinces where the provincial party

³We do not use coalmine accidents as the main outcome because the probability of such accidents is not the same across provinces, since production size differs.

secretaries are in the same political faction are more likely to report on each other's industrial safety accidents in the regional newspapers. As in the case of corruption investigations, party secretaries with multiple factions are more likely to report on other provinces. At the same time, party secretaries with multiple ties are also more likely to be attacked by other provincial newspapers than those with a single tie or no factional ties. Analyses on governors present similar but weaker tendencies of intra-faction competition, as models (6) to (10) show. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show a comparison of media reports by other provincial newspapers on corruption investigations and those on industrial accidents based on Models (2) and Models (5) in Table 2 and Table 4, respectively. Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the findings from governors.

A crucial assumption underlying our baseline analyses is that regional newspapers publish news articles based on the explicit interest or request of the provincial leaders such as the party secretary and governor. This can be done by direct order of politicians or their close subordinates, or it could be voluntarily implemented by newspaper editors whose career paths depend on party leaders. If our assumption is correct, one should expect that party-line newspapers, which are more closely aligned with the politicians, show a clearer pattern of politicized news reporting. Commercial newspapers, by contrast, have sales as the primary concern and should thus be less likely to utilize news reports to serve the political competition of provincial party leaders.

It is possible to propose an alternative explanation. News on co-faction members is perhaps more interesting or more worthwhile to the public than other news, so newspapers may be more likely to report it. If this is the case, one should see both party-line newspapers and commercial newspapers reporting such news in a similar way. Commercial newspapers, which are more

sensitive to the public's taste, may in fact report more on co-faction members corruption investigations.

The analyses in Table 5 confirm that the mechanism behind our main findings is intra-faction competition. Media attacks on co-faction peers are more pervasive in party-line newspapers than in commercial papers, undermining the possibility that the public demands such news. Instead, it seems to be political necessity and incentives that promote this pattern in news reporting. Figure 6 illustrates the findings in Models (2) and (7).

Finally, we examine whether the negative reports by other provinces, frequently those published in the co-faction peer's provinces, reduce the promotion prospects of the reported-on provincial leaders. Table 6 employs political turnovers of provincial party secretaries, while Table 7 uses political appointments of provincial governors. In all models, we include a variety of control variables that previous studies have found to be related to promotion such as factional ties, GDP growth, income level, age in quadratic form, and years of education (Chen, Li and Zhou 2005; Li and Zhou 2005; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012; Yao and Zhang 2015).

Model (1) in Table 6 first tests whether the event itself, i.e. a big corruption case or the death toll from a safety accident, affects the probability of promotion. In the case of provincial party secretaries, we find that ongoing corruption investigations indeed severely harm their promotion prospects, while the magnitude of industrial accidents, measured by the death toll of accidents, marginally affects their promotion in the future. Even controlling for the impact of the events *per se*, however, we find that other provinces' news reports affect promotion prospects significantly, both for corruption investigations and industrial safety accidents. As models (2) to (4) in Table 6 present, the number of news reports in other provinces regional

newspapers significantly reduces the likelihood of promotion of the reported province's party secretary. This negative effect is in addition to the negative effect of corruption investigations. Therefore, faction peers who report frequently on their counterparts negative news benefit by eliminating competitors from the promotion competition. This is not the only gain: the more provincial newspapers report on corruption investigations in other provinces, the more likely their own party secretaries are likely to be promoted (Model (5)). Reports on industrial accidents also have a positive impact on the reporting provincial leaders, but the effect is not statistically significant (Model (6)).

The findings on provincial governors in Table 7 are largely consistent with those on provincial party secretaries. Safety accidents appear to be somewhat more detrimental to provincial governors, whereas the effects of corruption investigations appear to be more costly for party secretaries. Both the number of corruption investigations and the death tolls from safety accidents reduce the future promotion prospects of provincial governors; corruption investigations do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, but reports on industrial accidents are significant and negatively related to governors odds of future promotion. In addition, reporting on other provinces' corruption cases also help provincial governor's promotion.

These findings reflect the division of labor and the locus of responsibility between party secretaries and governors in provincial governance: while political matters, particularly those related to the party discipline, such as corruption cases, are the party secretary's responsibilities, administrative issues, which would include industrial safety supervision, are considered the purview of the governor. At the same time, the party secretary still maintains overall supervisory responsibility over all provincial affairs.

As a robustness check, we employ an indicator variable to measure promotion. This alter-

native measure of promotion differentiates promotions from other forms of political turnover, such as lateral moves, staying in office, retirement, and demotion. The findings from the alternative measure in Table A.3 (party secretary) and Table A.4 (governor) are consistent with previous findings. Negative news reports by other provinces harm the promotion prospects of provincial leaders, particularly party secretaries, in the reported province. Reporting actively on other provinces' bad news, conversely, seems to help provincial leaders to move beyond the provincial office and serve in higher political positions.

Why do negative news reports in other provinces' regional newspapers, apart from the negative events themselves, harm the promotion probabilities of reported-on provincial leaders? It is unlikely that national leaders follow all regional newspapers. Nor would the central government collect regional news reports and systematically employ the data to evaluate provincial leaders. One possibility is a resonance effect. Once a corruption case or a large-sized safety accident in a province goes viral in another region's newspapers, it would be considerably more likely for the national newspapers in Beijing pick up the news. If this is the case, the central leaders, who pay close attention to the national newspapers, would have better access to the reported negative cases. To examine this possibility, we test whether provincial level reports affect the national news reports (Table 8). We find evidence that the number of regional news articles on corruption investigations and industrial accidents increases coverage of the same events in Beijings media. The resonance effect is even larger when the same faction members reports both corruption investigations and industrial accidents.

Discussion

Our analyses provide evidence supporting the tournament model, which we use to suggest that faction members compete with co-faction members to surpass their peers in the hierarchical political ladder. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that intra-factional competition can be fiercer than competition between factions. When Wang Yang was the party secretary of Guangdong (2007-2012), numerous news reports on Guangdong's corruption cases appeared in newspapers published in Shandong province. The party secretary of Shandong at that time was Jiang Yikang (2008-now), who was tied to the same patron, Wen Jiabao, as Wang Yang. The frequency of news reporting from Guangdong's newspapers on corruption cases in Shandong also increased at a remarkable rate, exceeding even the number of reports on corruption in Chongqing, a province governed by Bo Xilai, a famous political rival of Wang Yang from a different faction. In 2012, Wang Yang was promoted to the State Council as vice premier. Another example is the intense competition among the members of the Communist Youth League faction (also known as "tuanpai"). When Hu Chunhua succeeded in becoming the party secretary of Guangdong at 2012, the news coverage of corruption cases in Guangdong spiked in Hunan's newspapers. The party secretary from Hunan at the time was another tuanpai member, Zhou Qiang. Not long after, Zhou was promoted to President of the People's Supreme Court.

The analyses and anecdotes offer a fresh take on how authoritarian politicians behave under factional structure and competitive pressures for promotion. An important question that remains concerns the substantive implications of this intra-factional competition for the authoritarian regime and for ordinary citizens. One potential effect of intra-faction competition

is information revelation. Due to limited freedom of speech in authoritarian regimes, particularly in China where all media are tightly regulated by the government authorities, revelation of information disadvantageous to incumbent leaders is less frequent than in democracies. Reporting on the misgovernment of competing local leaders thus enables citizens to have more access to information on their government. In this regard, internal competition may have a positive impact on information accessibility. Whether or not the information available through intra-factional competition benefits citizens, however, requires deeper research. Although the revelation of information is generally meaningful in otherwise opaque authoritarian regimes, the degree to which the revealed information is unbiased and truthful is another question. Given its underlying political purposes, it is highly likely that politically selected information contains potential bias.

Another possible effect is a potential efficiency gain through competition. In-group competition benefits the regime and the citizens by leading otherwise simple loyalty-seekers to compete among factional peers to stand out. The authoritarian recruitment literature has long recognized the trade-off between loyalty and competence in factional politics. This, however, does not necessarily imply the absence of performance competition among loyal subordinates. If all subordinates are loyal, the patron has no reason not to consider competence in promotion. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy that factional competition is informal, and hence not necessarily based on defined criteria. Therefore, the basis of competition and its effects on promotion largely depend on the patron's needs and willingness to acknowledge the clients' performance.

Conclusion

This paper discusses the nature of elite competition in authoritarian settings. Existing studies often assume a tradeoff between loyalty and competence (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012). In this set-up, loyalty is the factor that keeps authoritarian elites within a leader's subgroup cohesive and committed to the leader. In this paper, we argue instead that authoritarian elites behave in order to maximize their own self-interest while remaining entirely loyal to their leader. To theorize such loyal but self-interested elite behavior, we propose two competing theoretical frameworks that might explain internal politics within political factions - the gang model and the tournament model.

The empirical evidence that we presented strongly supports the tournament model. Members of the same faction at a similar rank with similar turnover timing are more likely to tattle on one another's bad news or misgovernment than are members of other factions or provincial leaders with no factional tie to the current Politburo members. Provinces with a party secretary having multiple factional ties are more likely to attack co-faction members through newspaper reports. Meanwhile, provinces governed by a party secretary with a single patron in the Politburo are less likely to be criticized by newspapers from other provinces. These reports are politically effective for provincial leaders: those who report more frequently on other provincial leaders' poor performance are more likely to get promoted, whereas those more frequently reported on are less likely to be promoted.

We do not intend to argue that loyalty does not work for elite cohesiveness. Neither do we claim that members of different ties do not compete. Rather, the aim of this paper is to serve as a counterpoint to the existing view on elite competition which suggests that authoritarian

political factions act as a united group with an identical political goal. Internal politics within an elite group can be as dynamic as inter-factional conflicts in an authoritarian setting. This also indicates that faction politics does not necessarily imply reduced competition among lower level politicians compared to meritocratic competition model. While vertically loyal, faction clients are consistently competing with co-faction members not just on loyalty but also on other aspects of political performance.

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Table 1: Factional Ties and News Reports on Patrons (2000-2014)

	Newspaper Reports on Patron (log)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Party Secretary		Governor	
Same Faction	0.139*** (0.040)	0.075*** (0.006)	0.090+ (0.050)	0.077 (0.065)
Same Faction*NCP Year		0.029** (0.010)		0.015+ (0.006)
PSCM Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7650	7650	7650	7650
Adjusted R^2	0.375	0.318	0.021	0.018

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Factional Ties and Interprovincial News Report on Corruption Cases (Party Secretary)

	Newspaper Reports on Corruption Cases (log)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Age	-0.020+	-0.021*	-0.021+	-0.017	-0.018+
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Δ Years in Office	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.101***	-0.099***	-0.102***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Same Faction	0.496***	0.462***	0.398**	0.496***	0.381***
	(0.135)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.106)
News=0 & Event=1		-0.245*			
		(0.110)			
News=1 & Event=0		0.106			
		(0.107)			
News=0 & Event=0		-0.199			
		(0.199)			
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.138		0.130
			(0.107)		(0.125)
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.370**		0.374**
			(0.127)		(0.119)
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.232*	-0.205
				(0.103)	(0.125)
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.042	0.013
				(0.113)	(0.119)
Constant	1.423***	1.472***	1.222***	1.492***	1.259***
	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.091)	(0.134)
News Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Event Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992
Adjusted R^2	0.247	0.247	0.248	0.247	0.248

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: Factional Ties and Interprovincial News Report on Corruption Cases (Governor)

	Newspaper Reports on Corruption Cases (log)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ Age	0.007 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
Δ Years in Office	0.013 (0.029)	0.013 (0.029)	0.013 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)	0.013 (0.029)
Same Faction	0.396** (0.146)	0.318* (0.155)	0.287+ (0.152)	0.429** (0.151)	0.312* (0.157)
News=0 & Event=1		-0.429*** (0.105)			
News=1 & Event=0		-0.012 (0.095)			
News=0 & Event=0		-0.260* (0.132)			
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.249** (0.096)		0.249** (0.096)
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.500*** (0.107)		0.491*** (0.108)
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)				0.008 (0.094)	0.031 (0.094)
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.127 (0.099)	-0.081 (0.100)
News Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Event Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12936	12936	12936	12936	12936
Adjusted R^2	0.244	0.245	0.245	0.244	0.245

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Interprovincial News Report on Safety Accidents

	Newspaper Reports on Safety Accidents (log)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Provincial Party Secretary					Governor				
Δ Age	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)
Δ Years in Office	-0.035** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.038** (0.014)	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.040* (0.017)	0.024 (0.024)	0.024 (0.024)	0.024 (0.024)	0.024 (0.024)	0.024 (0.024)
Same Faction	0.602*** (0.140)	0.570*** (0.139)	0.527*** (0.133)	0.556*** (0.133)	0.461*** (0.094)	0.263+ (0.147)	0.199 (0.150)	0.204 (0.150)	0.232 (0.144)	0.163 (0.147)
News=0 & Event=1		-0.060 (0.075)					-0.271** (0.086)			
News=1 & Event=0		-0.066 (0.064)					-0.088 (0.069)			
News=0 & Event=0		-0.223* (0.097)					-0.183+ (0.104)			
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)			-0.147* (0.067)		-0.136 (0.111)			0.158* (0.075)		0.159* (0.076)
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.237** (0.082)		0.267* (0.105)			0.276*** (0.077)		0.291*** (0.080)
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.025 (0.091)	-0.016 (0.111)				-0.068 (0.068)	-0.054 (0.069)
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)				0.156* (0.075)	0.199+ (0.105)				0.103 (0.086)	0.131 (0.088)
News Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Event Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12936	12936	12936	12936	12936
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.111	0.112	0.111	0.112	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Type of Newspapers and Interprovincial News Report on Corruption Cases (Party Secretary)

	Newspapers Reports on Corruption Investigations (log)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Party Line Newspaper					Commercial Line Newspaper				
Δ Age	-0.019*	-0.021*	-0.020*	-0.017*	-0.019*	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Δ Years in Office	-0.085***	-0.086***	-0.087***	-0.085***	-0.088***	-0.014*	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Same Faction	0.416***	0.372***	0.321**	0.419***	0.309***	0.080+	0.091*	0.077	0.077+	0.073+
	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.085)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.037)
News=0 & Event=1		-0.260**					0.015			
		(0.079)					(0.045)			
News=1 & Event=0		0.074					0.032			
		(0.091)					(0.032)			
News=0 & Event=0		-0.241+					0.042			
		(0.135)					(0.102)			
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.169*		0.164			-0.031		-0.034
			(0.074)		(0.100)			(0.048)		(0.044)
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.364***		0.368***			0.005		0.006
			(0.093)		(0.096)			(0.053)		(0.042)
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.166+	-0.138				-0.066*	-0.067
				(0.087)	(0.100)				(0.030)	(0.044)
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)				-0.041	0.013				-0.001	0.000
				(0.094)	(0.096)				(0.037)	(0.042)
News Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Event Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992	12992
Adjusted R^2	0.235	0.235	0.235	0.235	0.236	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.146	0.145

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: News Reports and Provincial Party Secretaries' Promotion

	Political Turnover					
	(4=Promotion; 3=Lateral Transfer/Stay in Office; 2=Retirement; 1=Termination)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Cases	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.028*** (0.008)		-0.026** (0.008)	-0.027*** (0.008)	
Deaths in Safety Accidents	-0.001+ (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.001+ (0.000)
Reports by Other Province (Corruption Cases)		-0.159** (0.049)		-0.160*** (0.049)		
Reports by Other Province (Safety Accidents)			-0.049 (0.032)	-0.035 (0.033)		
Reports on Other Province (Corruption Cases)					0.073* (0.033)	
Reports on Other Province (Safety Accidents)						-0.122 (0.085)
Single Factional Ties	0.057 (0.053)	0.073 (0.053)	0.054 (0.054)	0.078 (0.053)	0.038 (0.054)	0.058 (0.055)
Multiple Factional Ties	-0.044 (0.060)	-0.018 (0.057)	-0.044 (0.060)	-0.004 (0.059)	-0.064 (0.058)	-0.032 (0.061)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.732 (0.654)	-0.987 (0.714)	-0.675 (0.651)	-0.995 (0.705)	-0.562 (0.661)	-0.819 (0.654)
GDP Per Captia (log)	-0.293 (0.255)	-0.276 (0.247)	-0.291 (0.253)	-0.272 (0.244)	-0.206 (0.255)	-0.371 (0.254)
Age	0.274* (0.132)	0.347** (0.123)	0.269* (0.136)	0.321* (0.125)	0.283* (0.130)	0.288* (0.133)
Age ²	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Years of Education	0.006 (0.018)	0.008 (0.018)	0.004 (0.019)	0.003 (0.018)	0.010 (0.018)	0.005 (0.019)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	420	420	420	420	420	420
Adjusted R^2	0.209	0.253	0.196	0.260	0.213	0.195

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7: News Reports and Provincial Governors' Promotion

	Political Turnover (4=Promotion; 3=Lateral Transfer/Stay in Office; 2=Retirement; 1=Termination)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Cases	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.025* (0.011)		-0.017 (0.017)	-0.023* (0.011)	
Deaths in Safty Accidents	-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001+ (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)
Reports by Other Province (Corruption Cases)		-0.059 (0.055)		-0.049 (0.042)		
Reports by Other Province (Safety Accidents)			-0.120*** (0.035)	-0.115*** (0.034)		
Reports on Other Province (Corruption Cases)					0.156*** (0.044)	
Reports on Other Province (Safety Accidents)						-0.033 (0.084)
Single Factional Ties	0.030 (0.060)	0.028 (0.062)	0.065 (0.061)	0.065 (0.061)	0.015 (0.060)	0.033 (0.060)
Multiple Factional Ties	-0.059 (0.076)	-0.090 (0.076)	-0.027 (0.072)	-0.024 (0.073)	-0.135+ (0.077)	-0.055 (0.077)
GDP Growth Rate	1.306+ (0.706)	1.252+ (0.700)	1.581* (0.680)	1.423* (0.670)	1.542* (0.708)	1.373+ (0.705)
GDP Per Captia (log)	-0.429 (0.298)	-0.339 (0.289)	-0.302 (0.288)	-0.284 (0.288)	-0.288 (0.292)	-0.475 (0.297)
Age	0.315* (0.127)	0.314* (0.133)	0.280* (0.128)	0.263* (0.129)	0.326* (0.131)	0.331** (0.127)
Age ²	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Years of Education	0.013 (0.016)	0.006 (0.016)	0.011 (0.015)	0.009 (0.015)	0.017 (0.016)	0.014 (0.015)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	420	420	420	420	420	420
Adjusted R^2	0.096	0.066	0.144	0.144	0.097	0.091

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Reports on Provincial Newspapers and National Newspapers

	Beijing (National) Newspapers			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corruption Reports by Other Provinces	0.005* (0.002)			
Accident Reports by Other Provinces		0.020*** (0.003)		
Corruption Reports by Same Faction Provinces			0.006* (0.003)	
Accident Reports by Same Faction Provinces				0.031*** (0.007)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	450	450	450	450
Adjusted R^2	0.329	0.574	0.272	0.562

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2: Factional Ties of Provincial Party Secretaries and Media Reports




Figure 3: Factional Ties of Provincial Party Secretaries and Media Reports (Type of Faction Ties)




Figure 4: Factional Ties of Provincial Governors and Media Reports




Figure 5: Factional Ties of Provincial Governors and Media Reports (Type of Faction Ties)





Figure 6: Factional Ties of Provincial Party Secretaries and Media Reports (Type of Newspapers)



Appendix

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Panel A	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All Newspaper (Exclude Beijing) on Corruption Cases	13,050	1.211	4.743	0	161
All Newspaper (Exclude Beijing) on Industrial Accidents	13,050	0.625	3.858	0	197
Party line Newspaper on Corruption Cases	13,050	0.927	3.777	0	129
Commercial line Newspaper on Corruption Cases	13,050	0.285	1.565	0	62
Province Party Secretary					
Δ Age	12,992	4.414	3.590	0	18
Δ Years in Office	13,050	2.236	2.168	0	13
Same Faction	13,050	0.201	0.401	0	1
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)	13,050	0.244	0.430	0	1
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)	13,050	0.536	0.499	0	1
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)	13,050	0.244	0.430	0	1
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)	13,050	0.536	0.499	0	1
Province Governor					
Δ Age	12,936	4.413	3.722	0	21
Δ Years in Office	13,050	1.974	1.802	0	9
Same Faction	13,050	0.153	0.360	0	1
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)	13,050	0.289	0.453	0	1
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)	13,050	0.467	0.499	0	1
Single Faction Ties (Event Prov)	13,050	0.289	0.453	0	1
Multiple Faction Ties (Event Prov)	13,050	0.467	0.499	0	1
All Beijing (National) Newspaper (Corruption Cases)	450	3.656	7.341	0	97
All Beijing (National) Newspaper (Industrial Accidents)	450	11.744	26.968	0	268
Reports by Other Provinces (Corruption Cases)	450	233.042	531.836	0	5682
Reports by Other Provinces (Industrial Accidents)	450	216.684	771.991	0	10972
Reports by Same Faction Provinces (Corruption Cases)	450	97.122	295.966	0	3120
Reports by Same Faction Provinces (Industrial Accidents)	450	94.467	462.516	0	7419
Reports on Other Provinces (Corruption Cases)	450	219.987	561.850	0	6212
Reports on Other Provinces (Industrial Accidents)	450	149.289	363.359	0	3613

Panel B	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Province Party Secretary					
Political Turnover	450	100%			
Promotion	42	9.33			
Lateral Transfer/Stay in Office	372	82.67			
Retirement	34	7.56			
Termination	2	0.44			
Single Ties (40/127)	450	0.256	0.437	0	1
Multiple Ties (45/127)	450	0.282	0.451	0	1
Age	450	59.096	4.016	47	67
Age ²	450	3508.405	463.991	2209	4489
Years of Education	450	17.362	1.881	15	21
Province Governor					
Political Turnover	450	100%			
Promotion	39	8.67			
Lateral Transfer/Stay in Office	370	82.22			
Retirement	37	8.22			
Termination	4	0.89			
Single Ties (38/129)	450	0.24	0.428	0	1
Multiple Ties (32/129)	450	0.231	0.422	0	1
Age	450	57.866	4.090	43	65
Age ²	450	3365.17	458.587	1849	4225
Years of Education	450	17.551	1.872	12	21
Report by Other Province (Corruption Case)	450	0.397	1.106	0	11.78
Report by Other Province (Safety Accident)	450	0.447	0.654	0	6.39
Reports on Other Province (Corruption Case)	450	0.383	0.838	0	7.01
Reports on Other Province (Safety Accident)	450	0.185	0.368	0	2.78
Big Corruption Cases	450	0.711	2.51	0	28
Death Tolls for Safety Accident	450	52.118	98.495	0	688
GDP Growth	434	0.143	0.051	-0.019	0.436
Per Capita GDP (logged)	434	9.777	0.768	7.923	11.509

Table A.2: Interaction Effects of Promotion Incentive and Factional Ties (Party Secretary)

	Newspaper Reports on Corruption Cases (log)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Age	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.018+ (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.021* (0.011)
Δ Years in Office	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.074*** (0.016)	-0.100*** (0.016)	-0.074*** (0.022)
Same Faction	0.708*** (0.179)	0.754*** (0.221)		
Δ Age \times Same Faction	-0.047 (0.029)			
Δ Years in Office \times Same Faction		-0.114** (0.044)		
Single Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.189+ (0.110)	0.216+ (0.111)
Multiple Faction Ties (News Prov)			0.669*** (0.167)	0.606*** (0.171)
Δ Age \times Multiple Faction Ties			-0.039* (0.019)	
Δ Years in Office \times Multiple Faction Ties				-0.044 (0.029)
News Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Event Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12992	12992	12992	12992
Adjusted R^2	0.247	0.247	0.247	0.247

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.3: News Report and Provincial Party Secretaries' Promotion

	Political Turnover (1=Promotion; 0=Otherwise)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Cases	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)		0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	
Deaths in Safty Accidente	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Reports by Other Province (Corruption Cases)		-0.025+ (0.015)		-0.026+ (0.015)		
Reports by Other Province (Safety Accidente)			0.006 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)		
Reports on Other Province (Corruption Cases)					0.067* (0.026)	
Reports on Other Province (Safety Accidente)						-0.036 (0.052)
Single Factional Ties	0.023 (0.034)	0.025 (0.035)	0.024 (0.034)	0.026 (0.034)	0.009 (0.034)	0.026 (0.035)
Multiple Factional Ties	0.001 (0.038)	0.003 (0.038)	0.001 (0.038)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.037)	0.006 (0.039)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.321 (0.365)	-0.346 (0.366)	-0.327 (0.363)	-0.385 (0.364)	-0.206 (0.366)	-0.327 (0.367)
GDP Per Captia (log)	-0.040 (0.157)	-0.034 (0.157)	-0.040 (0.155)	-0.044 (0.156)	0.030 (0.155)	-0.051 (0.154)
Age	-0.171* (0.080)	-0.155* (0.077)	-0.170* (0.080)	-0.162* (0.079)	-0.174* (0.076)	-0.167* (0.080)
Age ²	0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Years of Education	0.015 (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	420	420	420	420	420	420
Adjusted R^2	0.248	0.249	0.248	0.247	0.266	0.249

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.4: News Report and Provincial Governors' Promotion

	Political Turnover (1=Promotion; 0=Otherwise)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Cases	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)		-0.009 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	
Deaths in Safty Accidence	-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)
Reports by Other Province (Corruption Cases)		-0.039+ (0.021)		-0.047* (0.022)		
Reports by Other Province (Safety Accidence)			0.005 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)		
Reports on Other Province (Corruption Cases)					0.083* (0.038)	
Reports on Other Province (Safety Accidence)						-0.019 (0.048)
Single Factional Ties	0.011 (0.044)	0.011 (0.045)	0.011 (0.044)	0.013 (0.044)	0.003 (0.044)	0.012 (0.044)
Multiple Factional Ties	0.006 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.052)	0.005 (0.052)	0.008 (0.053)	-0.034 (0.052)	0.008 (0.052)
GDP Growth Rate	0.119 (0.452)	0.075 (0.470)	0.138 (0.457)	0.012 (0.464)	0.243 (0.457)	0.140 (0.454)
GDP Per Captia (log)	-0.083 (0.172)	-0.037 (0.172)	-0.102 (0.174)	-0.094 (0.172)	-0.010 (0.173)	-0.101 (0.173)
Age	-0.052 (0.087)	-0.054 (0.088)	-0.044 (0.087)	-0.056 (0.087)	-0.047 (0.091)	-0.047 (0.086)
Age ²	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Years of Education	0.003 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	0.003 (0.011)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	420	420	420	420	420	420
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.027	0.044	0.046	0.048	0.044

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$